Your Consumer Duty board report: the evidence a small brokerage already has
PRIN 2A.8 asks your board to sign off client outcomes yearly. What the FCA found thin, what CP26/23 would change, and where the evidence already sits.
A WhatsApp outage is a service failure for your brokerage. What FCA PS26/2, DORA and the Consumer Duty actually require, plus a continuity plan.
The first WhatsApp outage a brokerage lives through is usually a surprise. Not because messaging platforms never fail — they do — but because nobody had noticed how much of the client service day now runs through a single channel. Renewal chases, claim updates, document requests, the mid-term adjustment somebody promised to confirm before five o'clock: all of it sitting behind one dependency the firm does not own and cannot fix.
Two things have changed the regulatory picture recently. The FCA published PS26/2 in March 2026, creating a single operational incident and third party reporting regime that applies from 18 March 2027 to firms with Part 4A permission — which includes insurance intermediaries. And in the EU, DORA has been in application since January 2025, though with a carve-out that catches most brokerages by surprise in the other direction. This article is about what actually binds a 3-to-50 person firm, and what a workable continuity plan looks like.
"WhatsApp is down" covers several different failures, and they do not all hurt equally.
Rank them honestly and the fourth is the real risk. A brokerage that cannot message for ninety minutes has an inconvenience. A brokerage whose advisers spent ninety minutes advising off-system has a records problem it will discover eighteen months later, when a complaint arrives and the thread stops mid-sentence.
There is a lot of operational resilience material aimed at banks and insurers, and very little of it applies to an intermediary of this size. It is worth being precise, because firms waste effort building frameworks they do not owe and skip the obligations they do.
| Requirement | Applies to a 3–50 person brokerage? | What that means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| FCA SYSC 15A (important business services, impact tolerances, scenario testing) | Generally no | SYSC 15A.1.1R applies to enhanced scope SM&CR firms, banks, designated investment firms, building societies and Solvency II firms. A core or limited scope intermediary is outside it — but the concepts are still the clearest available template. |
| DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554), for EU-established firms | Usually no | Article 2(3) excludes insurance, reinsurance and ancillary insurance intermediaries that are microenterprises or small or medium-sized enterprises. Check the size test before assuming either way; growth or group structure can pull you in. |
| FCA PS26/2 operational incident reporting | Yes, from 18 March 2027 | Report an incident that disrupts operations and crosses the harm thresholds, with an initial report within 24 hours of determining the threshold is met. The bar is high — severe consumer harm, soundness, market integrity — so most short outages will not qualify. Knowing whether one qualifies is the work. |
| PS26/2 material third party register | Yes, from 18 March 2027 | Notify new or materially changed arrangements and keep a register submitted annually. If WhatsApp is your primary client-service channel, the honest materiality assessment is not obviously "no". |
| Consumer Duty, consumer support outcome (PRIN 2A.6) | Yes, today | PRIN 2A.6 applies regardless of the channel used. Customers must not face unreasonable barriers when they want to make a claim, amend a policy, complain or cancel. A channel that is down with no alternative is exactly that. |
The practical reading: the reporting regime gives you a deadline to organise around, but the obligation that applies right now is the Consumer Duty one, and it is a service obligation rather than a paperwork one. If a client cannot reach you to notify a claim, the fact that the fault was Meta's does not help them.
Skip the forty-page template. Seven decisions, written down, reviewed once a year:
An outage log is five columns and takes a minute an entry: time detected, what was unavailable, which clients were affected or likely to be, what you did instead, time resolved. Keep the vendor status page reference or screenshot alongside it.
This log does three jobs. It is the raw material for a PS26/2 report if one turns out to be needed, and reconstructing it a week later is much harder than writing it live. It is evidence for your Consumer Duty file that you noticed and responded rather than waited — the same evidence discipline that goes into a Consumer Duty board report a small brokerage can actually produce. And it is the input for your third party materiality assessment: three logged outages in a year with client impact answers the materiality question far better than an opinion does.
One thing worth checking with your platform provider before you need it: whether outbound messages are queued and retried or simply dropped, and whether inbound events are replayed after a gap. In ORIS, campaign sends go into an outbound queue that a worker drains with retries and progressive back-off rather than calling Meta directly, delivery statuses only ever move forward because Meta does not guarantee the order of its notifications, and every message stays attached to the customer record and the shared inbox thread — so the recovery burst lands in the right conversations instead of a pile of orphaned notifications. If you want to see how that behaves on a real book, book a walkthrough. Where your data physically sits during all this is a separate question, covered in our note on WhatsApp Cloud API data residency for EU and UK brokers.
Neither the plan nor the log is impressive. That is rather the point: the firms that handle an outage well are not the ones with the best framework, they are the ones where somebody decided in advance which three things must not stop and what happens instead. More on running the operational side of a brokerage in our organisation topic hub.
Probably not. SYSC 15A.1.1R lists enhanced scope SM&CR firms, banks, designated investment firms, building societies, Solvency II firms, UK RIEs, payment and e-money institutions and consolidated tape providers. A core or limited scope insurance intermediary is not in that list. Check your own SM&CR classification rather than assuming, and remember that the chapter's concepts — important business services, impact tolerance, mapping third parties — remain the clearest way to structure a plan even when the rule does not bind you.
No. Under PS26/2 the trigger is an operational incident that crosses defined thresholds — risk of severe consumer harm that is hard to recover from, risk to the soundness of the firm or market participants, or risk to market stability, integrity or confidence in the financial system. Most short channel outages will not reach that. The rules apply from 18 March 2027, and the initial report is due within 24 hours of the firm determining a threshold has been met, so the process you need is one that lets you make that determination quickly and evidence it.
Only if you fall outside the size carve-out. Article 2(3) of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 excludes insurance intermediaries, reinsurance intermediaries and ancillary insurance intermediaries that are microenterprises or small or medium-sized enterprises, using the definitions in Article 3. That exempts the large majority of independent brokerages. Run the size test on headcount and turnover or balance sheet total, record the conclusion, and re-run it if you acquire a book or the group structure changes.
No, and the reason is not the outage. A personal number produces conversations your firm cannot see, cannot archive and cannot retrieve for a complaint file, and it takes the client relationship with it when the adviser leaves. Give the team a fallback they are allowed to use — the published phone line with a note written to the file, or a monitored inbox — and say so before the outage rather than during it.
That depends on your firm, and it is a judgement you should document rather than assume. The test in PS26/2 turns on whether disruption to the service could cause client harm, threaten the integrity of the financial system or undermine your ability to meet regulatory obligations. If WhatsApp is the channel through which most clients notify claims and confirm instructions, the answer is at least arguable, and the sensible course is to record the assessment now and revisit it before March 2027.
Shared WhatsApp inbox, client records, follow-ups and opportunities for the whole brokerage. 15-minute demo.
PRIN 2A.8 asks your board to sign off client outcomes yearly. What the FCA found thin, what CP26/23 would change, and where the evidence already sits.
A text thread hides the signals a phone call reveals. How brokers identify vulnerability on WhatsApp, record it lawfully and prove outcomes under FG21/1.
A client asks for everything you hold on them. How a brokerage finds, filters and delivers WhatsApp threads inside the deadline, and when the clock can pause.